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Comments

The California Constitution and Counsel at Pretrial
Lineups: Disneyland Claims or Deadly
Serious Business?

In 1967 the Supreme Court of the United States declared that it
was a fundamental principal of American justice that a party accused of a crime be afforded counsel at a pretrial lineup.' Less
than six years later, in 1972, the court effectively withdrew that
right once called fundamental. 2 This turnabout is but a milestone
on a course that the Nixon court has taken to weaken established
procedural safeguards in the administration of criminal justice. 3
1. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
2. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
3. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (allowing the use of
statements obtained in violation of the Miranda rules to be admitted for
impeachment purposes); United States v. Dionisio, - U.S. - 93 S. Ct. 764
(1973) (allowing grand jury to obtain voice exemplars, on threat of contempt, without probable cause); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441
(1972) (holding use immunity to be co-extensive with the Fifth Amendment); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (allowing a less-thanunanimous jury verdict in criminal trials); United States v. Calandra, U.S. - 94 S. Ct. 613 (1974) (allowing evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment to be used at grand jury proceedings); United States
v. Robinson, -

U.S. -

94 S. Ct. 467 (1973), and Gustafson v. Florida,

-

U.S. - 94 S. Ct. 488 (1973) (allowing full body search on arrest for traffic
violation); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (allowing a Terry type
"stop and frisk" on the basis of an informer's unsubstantiated tip).

The time has passed when citizen/defendants could look to Washington and the Bill of Rights for vigorous enforcement of individual
rights against government abuse. It is paradoxical, in an age in
which the government continues to grow pervasively, that the court
should abdicate its position as a leader in insuring procedural fairness and be content with setting constitutional minimums. 4 Withdrawal is hardly the proper posture at this point in our civilization. Rather, bold steps need to be taken to confront and re-evaluate concepts of "individual liberty," "privacy," and "due process"
in an age which stands in the wings of an Orwellian stage dominated by an electronic media and controlled by a super-sophisticated police force.5
The activist years of the Warren court have left the impression
that if one is to "forge" new law that it must be done, if at all, from
the fabric of the Bill of Rights. The fact that the Supreme Court
has been "followed" for the past 20 years has given the federal Constitution an apparent position of supremacy as the "wellspring" of
jurisprudence. When attorneys talk of the constitution, it is usuaally with the Bill of Rights in mind; however this was not always
so. The Fourteenth Amendment was not adopted until 18686 and
was not applied until 1897.7 Most of the incorporation via the Fourteenth Amendment has occurred during the last 20 years-the Warren years.8 Prior to this time, the states relied on their own state
constitutions to regulate the balance between government power
and individual rights. The retrenching of the Nixon court, and
some of the justices' avowed purpose of merely setting minimums,
may signal a return to reliance on the state constitution for insuring procedural rights to defendants in criminal prosecutions. It is
hardly enough to say that the Warren years have furnished the
4. See Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Johnson v. Louisiana, 4a6
U.S. 356 (1972).
Also, Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-489 (1972).

5. See Justice Douglas' dissent in Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206
(1966) and Justice Harlan's dissent in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971).
6. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV (1868).

7. Chicago B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
8. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment
right to counsel); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth

Amendment protection against illegal search and seizure); Benton v. Mary-

land, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (Fifth Amendment double jeopardy clause);
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (Sixth Amendment right to
speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (Sixth Amendment

right of confrontation); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 214 (1967)
Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses).

(Sixth
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criminal defendant with all he deserves. As the computerized
agents of the police power become increasingly "efficient", there is
all the more need to find a source of law which will give the citizen
power to counteract these forces, lest the individual 'be lost in the
flush.
Looking to the state constitution as a source of law would not be a
new phenomenon in California in that the state has a long history of
using that document for setting standards which are higher than
that required by the federal Constitution.9 The most striking example of the California Supreme Court's use of the state constitution
came in People v. Anderson,0 where the court struck down the
death penalty as both cruel and unusual punishment. Associate
Justice Stanley Mosk, in commenting on the Anderson decision,
said:
Contrary to the implication of the Attorney General that Anderson
was an aberration and that the state Supreme Court has not rendered opinions based upon state constitutional grounds, there are
innumerable examples over the years of cases in which we have
done so. The use of the state constitution, as our court did in Anderson and other cases, was no sport designed to thwart federal review. We have long regarded the declaration of rights of the California Constitution as a charter of independent significance. I do
not find . . . the slightest impropriety when the highest court of
a state invalidates state legislation, state administrative action, or
the conviction of a defendant in a state prosecution as being violative of the state constitution. Nor is the problem exacerbated
merely because the state constitutional provision is similar to, or
even identical with, the federal constitution."

The California Constitution is an independent document which
gives the state Supreme Court an adequate non-federal ground for
decision. The California Supreme Court need not ignore the Supreme Court, indeed it must adhere to the constitutional minimums set by that court, but should follow the Supreme Court only
when its argument is intellectually persuasive. It is from this outlook that this paper will deal with the narrow issue of a right to
counsel at pre-indictment lineups-an outlook which looks to
9. Falk, The State Constitution: A More than "Adequate" Nonfederal
Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 273 (1973).
10. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880 (1972), cert. denied,

406 U.S. 958 (1972).

11. Address by Associate Justice Stanley Mosk, Southern California As-

sociation of Law Libraries' Second Annual Institute on California Law,
March, 1974.

the California Constitution to maintain existing rights and to reinstate those lost through erosion by recent Supreme Court decisions.
THE HISTORY OF THE WADE DECIsION

In United States v. Wade,12 the Supreme Court held that a pretrial
lineup held in the absence of defendant's counsel was a violation of
the Sixth Amendment. For a pretrial lineup held without benefit
of counsel, Wade afforded the remedy of per se exclusion of all
identification testimony at trial unless the prosecution could establish by clear and convincing evidence that the witness's identification of the defendant had a source independent of the unconstitutional lineup. 13 Wade, unlike Miranda,'4 had no real roots in prior
decisions of the court, but stemmed rather from a somewhat belated
recognition of dangers inherent in the police lineup. Wade recognized
[a] major factor contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage
of justice from mistaken identification has been the degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents
the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification.' 5

Eyewitness identification is perhaps the most unreliable form of evidence in a criminal prosecution and causes more convictions of the
innocent than any other method of proof. The news media continually carries stories of men mistakenly identified as the perpetrators of crime. No one will ever know how many innocent defendants have been convicted by mistaken identification. When we
do find out, it is usually then only by accident.' 6 Realizing both
the necessity for police lineups and the risks involved in the procedure, the Wade court saw counsel as the factor which would balance out the interests by allowing the police to conduct the lineup,
but only if the suspect had counsel to represent him. The presence
of an attorney at the lineup makes possible a later showing that
the identification made was impermissibly suggestive and of no
evidentiary value or will serve to reinforce the witness's statement, "That's the man." The presence of counsel preserves the
right to fair trial by allowing the defense to demonstrate to the
12.

Supra note 1.

13. Prior to Wade, the manner in which the lineup was conducted affected only the weight of the witnesses' testimony, not its admissibility.
See, e.g., People v. Parham, 60 Cal. 2d 378, 384 P.2d 1001, 33 Cal. Rptr. 497

(1963).
14. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
15.

388 U.S. at 228.

16. See WALL, EYE-WNEsS
Edition, 1971.

IDENTIFICATION i

CRIInNAL CASES,

Second
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court or jury that the identification procedures used by the police
were the basis of the identification and not the witness's memory.
PRE-INDICTMENT VS. POST-INDICTMENT-THE CALIFORNIA VIEW

In Wade the defendant had been indicted for bank robbery and
had appointed counsel. Forty-nine days after indictment, two witnesses identified Wade as the robber at a police lineup without
presence of Wade's counsel. The post-indictment language in
Wade became the focus of some controversy among the state courts
and what was later to be its almost total emasculation. A few
courts interpreted Wade as limiting the right to counsel to lineups
conducted only after indictment, 17 whereas, the majority of courts
that considered the question held the post-indictment language to
be merely descriptive and not a limitation on the right to counsel's
presence.'
The question was first presented to the California Supreme Court
in People v. Fowler9 some two years after the Wade decision. In
Fowler the defendant surrendered himself to the police after a
warrant had been issued for his arrest. Prior to arraignment, Fowler, without counsel's presence, was exhibited in a lineup at which
he was identified by a witness. This out-of-court identification
was later used in obtaining Fowler's conviction. The Fowler court,
in rejecting the contention that the Wade post-indictment language
17. People v. Kirby, 121 Ill. App. 2d 323, 257 N.E.2d 589 (1970); State
v. Fields, 104 Ariz. 486, 455 P.2d 964 (1969); State v. Walters, 457 S.W.2d
817 (Mo.) (1970); Perkins v. State, 228 So. 2d 382 (Fla.) (1969); Buchanan
v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 664, 173 S.E.2d 792 (1970).
18. Billinger v. State, 9 Md. App. 628, 267 A.2d 275 (1970); State v. Oliver, 161 Conn. 348, 288 A.2d 81 (1971); State v. Hicks, 76 Wash. 2d 80, 455
P.2d 943 (1969); State v. Singleton, 253 La. 18, 215 S.2d 838 (1968); State
v. Jenkins, 277 A.2d 703 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); Greer v. State, 1 Tn. Cr.
407, 443 S.W.2d 681 (1969); Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 175 N.W.2d 625
(1970); Commonwealth v. Guillory, 356 Mass. 591, 254 N.E.2d 427 (1970);
Martinez v. State, 437 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); State v. Isaacs,
24 Ohio App. 2d 115, 265 N.E.2d 327 (1970); Thompson v. State, 85 Nev.
134, 451 P.2d 704 (1969); State v. Wright, 274 N.C. 84, 161 S.E.2d 581 (1968);
People v. Hutton, 21 Mich. App. 312, 175 N.W.2d 860 (1970); Commonwealth
v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 738 (1970); In Re Holley, 107 R.I. 615,
268 A.2d 723 (1970). In addition, every court of appeal that considered the
question held the right to counsel at lineups attached pre-indictment. See,
e.g., Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1968).
19. 1 Cal. 3d 335, 461 P.2d 643, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1969).

set the legal limits to the right to counsel at lineups, outlined five
reasons why counsel should be present pre-indictment. First, the
dangers that inure in a police lineup are not reduced by the formal
filing of an indictment or information. Second, counsel is required
at any stage of the proceedings where there is a potential for substantial prejudice to the defendant's rights such as in Escobedo and
Miranda. Third, the dissent in Wade felt
The rule applies to any lineup, to any other techniques employed
to produce an identification and a fortiori to a face-to-face encounter between the witness and suspect alone, regardless of when
the identification occurs, in time
or place, and whether before or
20
after indictment or information.

Fourth, Stovall v. Denno,21 decided the same day as Wade, held
that the per se exclusionary rule would not be retroactively applied, but intimated that if it were, it would be applicable to Stovall's pre-indictment lineup. Fifth,
• . . we think it clear that the establishment of the date of formal
accusation as the time wherein the right to counsel at lineup attaches could only lead to a situation wherein substantially all lineups would be conducted prior to indictment or information. We
cannot reasonably suppose that the high court, recognizing that the
same dangers of abuse and misidentification exist in all lineups,
would2 announce a rule so susceptible of emasculation by avoidance.

One year later in People v. Martin,28 the California Supreme
Court took this reasoning still further into a pure Escobedo-Miranda analogy in holding that the per se exclusionary rule extended to show-ups prior to arrest. That even though the
...defendant 'voluntarily' accompanied the officers to the police
station, the circumstances of his apprehension lead us to conclude
that he was in custody in a constitutional sense because he could
reasonably
have believed that he was deprived of his freedom of
24
action.

The fact that Martin was under detention, but not yet arrested, led
the court to the conclusion that the witness viewing Martin at the
police station was indeed a critical stage of the proceedings, within
the meaning of Wade, to which the right to assistance of counsel
attached.
The California Supreme Court took the reasoning of Wade to its
logical conclusion in requiring counsel at custodial lineups.
20. 388 U.S. at 251.
21. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).

22. 1 Cal. 3d at 344, 461 P.2d at 650, 82 Cal. Rptr at 370.
23. 2 Cal. 3d 822, 471 P.2d 29, 87 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1970).

24. Id. at 829, 471 P.2d at 34, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 714.

The
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court saw no reason to distinguish one lineup from another, on the

basis of arrest or indictment, as long as fruits of that lineup
could be used to convict the subject of the lineup. In California the
dangers of the lineup were the focus of attention rather than abstract considerations of a point in time at which counsel was required.
PRE-INDICTMENT VS. POST-INDICTIVmENT-THE FEDERAL APPROACH

The Supreme Court was unimpressed with the reasoning of the
California Supreme Court in Fowler and Martin, and the major-

ity of other jurisdictions that had answered the question. In
Kirby v. Illinois,25 the court reasoned that the right to counsel established in Wade stemmed from the Sixth Amendment and that a
long line of cases had established that the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel attached only upon initiation of adversary judicial proceedings against the defendant. Using Powell v. Alabama26 and
Johnson v. Zerbst 27 as stepping stones, the plurality opinion

waded across the deeper issues underlying the need for counsel at
lineups. The fact that counsel was required at custodial interrogations in Escobedo and Miranda, prior to the initiation of adversary
judicial proceedings, was seen as an unrelated Fifth Amendment
issue not relevant to the right to counsel at lineups. Because Wade
was grounded in the Sixth Amendment and historically the right to
counsel attached only upon the filing of a formal charge against the
defendant, no counsel would be required at a pre-indictment
lineup. The plurality opinion is perhaps best summed up in the
following:
In this case we are asked to import into a routine police investigation an absolute constitutional guarantee historically and rationally applicable only after the onset of formal prosecutorial proceedings. We decline to do so. 28
In Wade a pretrial lineup had been characterized as a confrontation which is "peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and
variable factors which might seriously, even crucially, derogate
from a fair trial. ' 29 Six years later in Kirby that same pretrial
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Supra note 2.
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
304 U.S. 458 (1938).
406 U.S. at 690.
388 U.S. at 228.

lineup has become a mere "routine police investigation.." There are two factors which distinguish Kirby from Wade and
serve to explain the limitation on the per se exclusionary rule.
First, in the six years that separate the opinions, the make-up of
the court has changed dramatically. Justice Stewart, who dissented in Wade, wrote the plurality opinion in Kirby. He was
joined by Justices Powell, Blackmun, Rehnquist and Burger. In
1965, two years before Wade was written, then Circuit Judge Burger expressed his views concerning the right to counsel at pretrial
lineups:
Such 'Disneyland' contentions as that absence of counsel at the police lineup voids a conviction are becoming commonplace. Some
arise from the hard experience of court-appointed lawyers who,
having served diligently without compensation, later find themselves subjected to vicious and unwarranted attacks by their exclients for failing to raise some bizarre point conceived by the 'legal experts' in prison. Having found that the indigent client's sense
of gratitude is readily dulled by incarceration, some court appointed counsel find it expedient to protect themselves by raising
80
every point, however absurd, which indigent appellants suggest.

Kirby represents the insensitivity of the new members of the court
to the problems inherent in any pretrial lineup more than a
serious Sixth Amendment analysis. Even if the Sixth Amendment
historically is not applied pre-indictment, it will be shown that the
right to counsel at lineups is not grounded solely on the Sixth
Amendment, but rather on an interplay of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The second factor which distinguishes Kirby from Wade is the
timing of the filing of a formal charge. In Kirby no complaint or
indictment had been filed, whereas in Wade, a grand jury had
found probable cause to hold Wade over for trial.. The Kirby court
saw the arraignment or indictment as the point at which the right
to counsel historically attached and found a place to hang their
hat. In short, Kirby holds that only when probable cause has
been found, does a defendant really need counsel at a lineup. If
the prosecution does not have enough evidence to file a formal
charge, they may, by virtue of Kirby, use a lineup conducted without counsel to obtain evidence sufficient to file against the defendant.
Kirby therefore requires counsel mainly in the 'other evidence'
cases where apart from identification testimony, there exists other
evidence which establishes probable cause to arrest and charge
.... By virtue of Kirby, no right to counsel exists for lineups in
'pure' identification cases. These are the cases where there exists
30. Williams v. United States, 345 F.2d 733, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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no evidence to justify a formal arrest or charge-in short, those
cases where apart from the identification (to be made in absence
of counsel), there is no other evidence connecting the defendant
with the crime or to establish guilt. These are the cases where
counsel is most needed-where there exists the only real danger
of convicting the innocent. The accused's fate will be decided not
in a courtroom, but in a show-up staged in a police station before
formal arrest and without counsel. 31
The major flaw in the Kirby opinion is the failure to adequately
distinguish between the risks involved in a pre-indictment lineup
as opposed to a post-indictment lineup. Indeed, as Judge Sobel
points out, the dangers of a pre-indictment lineup are perhaps
greater than in a post-indictment lineup.
FOLLOWING KIRBY-CHOJNACKY'S BLUES

After the California Supreme Court decision in Fowler, but before the Supreme Court decision in Kirby, Kenneth Chojnacky was
arrested for robbery. Prior to the filing of a complaint, the police
decided to put Chojnacky in a lineup. Chojnacky did not waive
counsel, so a member of the public defender's office was called to
represent him. When the public defender arrived at the lineup,
the police would not allow him to talk to Chojnacky nor would the
police tell the public defender which member of the lineup was his
client. Subsequently, the witness's identification testimony was
admitted at trial and Chojnacky was convicted of robbery.
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the refusal of the police to
tell the public defender who his client was denied Chojnacky effective assistance of counsel at the lineup and therefore violated the
Wade-Fowler rule.
At this point, Kirby v. Illinois was handed down by the United
States Supreme Court and People v. Chojnacky32 reached the California Supreme Court. The opinion that resulted has left California law regarding counsel at lineups in limbo.
Justice Burke wrote an opinion joined by Chief Justice Wright
and Justice McComb holding that Kirby retroactively controlled
31. N. SOBEL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION, pp. 32-33 (1972). Nathan R.
Sobel draws his conclusions from experience in that as a New York State
County Judge and Supreme Court Justice, he has presided over 2,000 criminal jury trials.
32. 8 Cal. 3d 759, 505 P.2d 530, 106 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1973).

and therefore, Chojnacky had no right to counsel at a lineup that
preceded the initiation of judicial criminal proceedings. This approach made consideration of the question of effective assistance
of counsel at the lineup irrelevant.
Justice Mosk concurred in the decision, but reached his conclu-3
sion by very different reasoning. By virtue of Stovall v. Denno,
Justice Mosk reasoned that Kirby was not retroactive and Fowler
controlled. In Justice Mosk's view, Chojnacky's inability to consult with counsel did not affect the basic fairness of the lineup
and therefore there was no violation of the rule of Fowler.
Justice Sullivan and Justice Tobriner dissented. The dissenting
judges agreed with Justice Mosk that Kirby was not retroactive
and that Fowler controlled, but disagreed as to the effect of the
public defender not knowing who he was representing at the
lineup. The dissent agreed with the Court of Appeal
...that for an attorney intelligently to be a 'silent observer' he
should know what he is observing. At the very least, he should
know who his 'client' is so that he may examine the other8members
of the lineup for indications of similarity and dissimilarity. 4

Viewing Chojnacky as a whole, three justices held Kirby controlled and three justices expressly declined to reach the question
of whether Kirby compelled re-examination of Fowler. At this
point in time, the Fowler-Martinline of cases has been shaken, but
remains as law as a result of this 3-3 split.3 5 The Courts of Appeal
in California now follow Kirby3 6 and will continue to do so until
the California Supreme Court makes a definitive statement.

It is

true that the Fowler-Martin line of cases was based on the federal constitution, and in light of Kirby, the federal constitution
no longer requires what the Fowler-Martin line compels. Even
though based on the federal constitution, the reasoning of the
Fowler-Martin line is a unique product of the California Supreme

Court which finds a counterpart only among the dissenters on the
United States Supreme Court.3 7 In view of the California Supreme Court's compelling reasoning in the Fowler-Martin line of
33. Supra note 21.
34. 8 Cal. 3d at 770, 505 P.2d at 537, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 113.
35. Justice Peters died January 2, 1973. At the time of the decision in
People v. Chojnacky, his seat had not been filled-thus, the 3-3 split of the
court.
36. People v. Faulkner, 28 Cal. App. 3d 384, 104 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1972);
People v. O'Roy, 29 Cal. App. 3d 656, 105 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1972); People v.
Strawder, 34 Cal. App. 3d 370, 108 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1973).
37. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 691 (1972) (Justice Brennan, Justice
Douglas, Justice Marshall and Justice White dissenting).
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cases, and the state's history of not following dot for dot all federal nuances in criminal procedure, 38 it is time for the court to
re-examine the issue of counsel at lineups from a fresh approach
based on California law and precedent.
APPROACHING THE PROBLEM

There is a body of law in California which demonstrates that
there are two possible avenues open for the California Supreme
Court to require counsel in situations where the federal courts do

not. First,Article I section 13 of the California Constitution

9

has a

long history of setting standards higher than those required by
the federal constitution, 40 and second, the Supreme Court of California is free to declare a rule of criminal procedure that requires

counsel in situations not covered by the federal courts.4

1

However,

38. Perhaps the best example is the refusal of the California courts to
follow the federal standing requirements for challenging Fourth Amendment violations.

(1955)..
39. CAL.

See, e.g., People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855

CONST.

art. I, sec. 13 (West 1954), provides inter alia:

In criminal prosecutions, in any court whatever, the party accused
shall have the right to . . . be personally present with counsel ....

No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or prop-

erty without due process of law .
40. In re Rider, 50 Cal. App. 797, 195 P. 965 (1920) interpreted Art. I.,
sec. 13 to require that a juvenile detained on a felony charge had the right
to assistance of counsel, whereas the Supreme Court did not require the
same right until 47 years later in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In re Jingles, 27 Cal. 2d 496, 165 P.2d 12 (1946) held that Art. I, sec. 13 required
that a defendant charged with a misdemeanor had a right to appointed
counsel-the same right was not extended by the Supreme Court until 26
years later in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Perhaps the most
important decision utilizing Art. I, sec. 13 came in People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.
2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965), where the California Supreme
Court held, prior to Miranda, that a person held for questioning prior to
indictment must be informed of his right to counsel.
41. This method was first used in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282
P.2d 905 (1955), where the California Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule prior to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1969). The Cahan approach
was recently used in People v. Vickers, 8 Cal. 3d 451, 503 P.2d 1313, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 305 (1972) in fashioning a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure requiring that a probationer is entitled to representation by retained
or appointed counsel at formal proceedings for the revocation of probation.
In holding a probationer has a right to counsel at probation hearings, the
court went beyond the Supreme Court decision in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972), which set up minimum due process requirements, but did
not require counsel. Chief Justice Burger at 408 U.S. at pp. 488-489 said:

the mere fact that the California Supreme Court is free to require
counsel at lineups where the federal courts do not is clearly not a
sufficiently compelling reason for the court to act. What is required is a re-examination of the problems that underlie eye-witness identification at lineups and the relationship of counsel to
those problems.
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROBLEM

In the area of eye-witness identification, three primary problems
present themseves to those involved in the criminal process. First,
the nature of the human organism and its inherent fallibilities in
both perception and memory. Second, suggestive identification
procedures utilized by the police or prosecuting agencies. And
third, the inherent difficulties in determining whether the lineup
identification is reliable.
Fundamental fairness demands that any criminal system deal
with these problems in a manner which is favorable to the accused. 42 Delays and additional expenses in prosecution that result
from implementing safeguards are far outweighed by the potential
for wrongfully convicting an innocent person on the basis of unreliable eye-witness identification. The task thus imposed on the
judiciary is to require that the defendant is afforded a "fair" lineup,
regardless of where or when it takes place, in order to insure the
reliability of the evidence offered to link the defendant with criminal activity.
The makers of both the state and federal constitutions provided
for no specific right to deal with the problems peculiar to eye-witness identification. The Wade opinion approached the problem by
emphasizing a lineup as a critical stage of the prosecution to which
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached. But what if
counsel is present at the lineup and the conduct of the lineup is unfair? The Wade per se exclusionary rule does not pretend to deal
with these situations, rather, only with lineups at which counsel
at which counwas not present. The remedy for an unfair lineup
48
sel is present was established in Stovall v. Denno.
We cannot write a code of procedure; that is the responsibility of
each State. Most States have done so by legislation6 others by
ur task is
judicial decision usually on due process grounds.
limited to deciding the minimum requirements of due process.

42. In England the accused is informed of his right to have counsel or
a friend present at a lineup, both orally and in writing. In France there
is often a magistrate present at the lineup to insure its fairness. See generally, WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES, p. 42.

43. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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[t]he required inquiry is two-pronged. The first question is
whether the initial identification procedure was 'unnecessarily' or
'impermissibly' suggestive.

If it is found to have been so, the

court must then proceed to the question whether the procedure
found to have been 'unnecessarily' or 'impermissibly' suggestive

was so 'conducive to irreparable mistaken identification' or had
such a tendency 'to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable mis-identification' that allowing the witness 44to make an
in-court identification would be a denial of due process.
The Fourteenth Amendment due process protection afforded by
Stovall is the primary right of the accused-the right to a fairly
conducted lineup. The Stovall due process protection attempts to
deal with the first and second problems outlined above: human
fallibilities in perception and suggestive procedures used in conducting the lineup.
The Kirby decision, by denying the right to counsel at pre-indictment lineups, has left the accused with only the due process protection provided by Stovall. Due process does require the exclusion of eye-witness identification based on an unfairly conducted
lineup, but the difficulty remains for the accused to establish that
his rights were violated-the third problem outlined above.
The proof problems the accused faces in challenging the fairness
of the lineup are unlike those he meets in attempting to rebut scientific proof offered by the prosecution. For example, blood 45
drawn from a suspect accused of drunk driving is subjected to an
experimental set-up in a laboratory and put through identical steps
each time to arrive at the alcohol content. The scientific method
allows for elimination of variables and for test results which are
constant under normal experimental condition. Counsel is not required at the blood test because the same sample tested by any
two lab technicians will theoretically produce the same results. 46
Because counsel or his experts are aware of the correct laboratory
procedure, the lab technician testifying at trial may .be subjected to
effective cross-examination to determine if the procedure used was
44. Phillips v. Follette, 428 S.2d 912, 914, 915 (2d Cir. 1970).
Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969).

See also

45. Other examples which are subject to the same procedure would include such techniques as fingerprint analysis, ballistics, voice graphs, handwriting analysis, "breathalyzer" test, chemical analysis, spectroscopy, microscopy and forensic pathology.
46. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).

within the allowable limits for accurate results. In other words,
the blood test may be scrutinized in court to determine that it
was fair.
The lineup, on the other hand, is inherently variable and incapable of reproduction in court.
In People v. Fowler (citation omitted), it was contended that it
would be possible to reconstruct the lineup [at trial] from, among
other things, photographs taken of the show-up line after the lineup
was completed. This procedure is clearly inadequate because there
is no assurance that the post-lineup
photographs duplicate what the
47
witness actually observed.
Not only is the lineup method of identification itself fraught with
uncertainty and chance for error, the ability of the accused to ferret out unfairness in the lineup is tremendously difficult because
48
he doesn't know what went on at the lineup.
It is possible that a lineup could be fair without the presence of
counsel, but ultimately the reliability of any evidence is dependent
on its testability. Testability implies a procedure that allows for a
determination of the trustworthiness of the evidence offered-such
as the scientific method allows for in a blood test. Evidence presented which is not subject to testing by the defendant is inherently
49
a denial of due process.
47. People v. Lawrence, 4 Cal. 3d 273, 481 P.2d 212, 93 Cal. Rptr. 204,
(1971) at note 2.
48. The accused is normally of little help to defense counsel in attempting to reconstruct what took place at the lineup in that:
1) The accused may not be able to see the witness and the police
because of the design of the "stage" on which the lineup is
conducted (one-way mirrors, lights, etc.).
2) The accused is normally separated from the witness and cannot hear conversations between the witness and the police.
3) Unless the accused is a "veteran" of lineups, he will not be
sensitive to potential prejudicial aspects of the procedure.
4) The accused, in order to challenge the lineup, may have to
waive his Fifth Amendment privilege in order to enforce his
Fourteenth Amendment rights, creating the constitutionally
questionable situation of waiving one right to secure another.
[Cf. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). But see Williams
v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).]
49. At the lowest level, due process will demand that a defendant be
afforded an opportunity to "test" the evidence against him by cross-examination. Evidence which is produced as a result of the scientific method allows the defendant greater "clarity" of cross-examination by affording the
opportunity to probe into the known limits within which accurate results
may be obtained. Prior to trial, through a discovery process, the defendant's own experts may be able to test the evidence sought to be introduced
against him. The California Supreme Court in People v. Hitch, 11 Cal. 3d
159, -

P.2d -, -

Cal. Rptr. -

(1974) has held that destruction of breath-

alyzer equipment prior to trial, without affording the defendant an opportunity to test the equipment, denies him due process. Contrast this with
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[Tihe procedural rules which have been fashioned from the generality of due process are our best instruments for the distillation
and evaluation of essential facts from the conflicting welter of data
that life and our adversary methods present. It is these instruments of due process which enhance the possibility that truth will
emerge from the confrontation of opposing versions and conflicting
data. 'Procedure is to law what 'scientific method' is to science.' 50
To deny the accused the presence of counsel at a lineup is to deprive
him of the procedural "tools" necessary to test the reliability of the
identification evidence. Without being able to record hesitancy,
mistake, subtle suggestion, dissimilarity of lineup participants or
other irregularities in the lineup, the defendant must cross-examine
witnesses without knowledge of the variables in the method used
to arrive at the witness's conclusion "that's the man."
The Kirby historical analysis of Sixth Amendment rights attaching only on formal charge was misplaced in failing to perceive
that it was not the right to counsel that was at issue, but rather
the right of the accused to secure his Fourteenth Amendment right
to a fair lineup. It is clear that due process protects the accused
from an unfair lineup, but that right is indeed a hollow one if there
are no means available to enforce it. At the present state of the
art, the presence of counsel at any lineup is the only way to guarantee the accused's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair lineup.
Counsel functions at the lineup not as a director or a choreographer,
but as a silent observer recording the event for later reconstruction at trial. The denial of counsel at a pretrial lineup effectively
precludes the accused from reconstructing the event and asserting
the situation in which one or more witnesses identify the defendant at a
lineup where the defendant is not represented by counsel. This evidence
is then introduced at trial against the defendant (see Cal. Evidence Code,
section 1238) and is not subject to anything but defense counsel's speculative attack on cross-examination. The primary value expressed by the concept of due process is that seeking to minimize the possibility that an innocent man will be punished. Surely, if due process requires the defendant
be afforded the opportunity to test highly reliable physical evidence such
as a breathalyzer ampule or blood prior to trial, it also requires that the
defendant be afforded an opportunity to test highly unreliable eye-witness
identification evidence produced at a lineup. At the very least, the presence of counsel at the lineup would remove the cloud of ignorance through
which the lineup witness must now be cross-examined. At most, the presence of counsel at the lineup would serve to enhance the integrity of the
fact-finding processes in court and prevent the conviction of innocent men.
50. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21 (1967).

his' due process right to a fair lineup. Just as Miranda saw the
presence of counsel as necessary to insure the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, counsel is required at a lineup
to insure the accused's due process right to a fair lineup.5 ' The
presence of counsel at the lineup would insure that the police procedure in conducting. the lineup conforms to the dictates of due
process.
APPROACHING A CALIFORNIA SOLUTION

In People v. Graves5 2 the defendant, relying on Escobedo, sought
to exclude handwriting exemplars taken from him after arrest on
the theory that he had a right to counsel when the exemplars
were taken. The court concluded
We find no support in Escobedo for invoking the right to counsel

to block scientific crime investigation. Reliance on handwriting exemplars for expert analysis is not a substitute for thorough scientific investigation of crime but an excellent example of such investigation. 53

The court was obviously impressed with the scientific nature of
handwriting analysis in denying the defendant a right to counsel
when the exemplars were taken. It is the scientific nature of the
process and the defendant's ability to produce his own expert witnesses which obviates the need for counsel at such encountersfactors which are not present in the lineup procedure.

In the landmark decision of People v. Dorado54 the California Supreme Court recognized the need for counsel at any stage of the

proceedings where rights may be irretrievably lost if not then and
there asserted or protected. Quoting Justice Schauer, the court
held
Neither Article I, section 13, nor the statutes implementing the right
granted therein, should be construed in a manner that would ham-

per legitimate police investigation when no substantial right of the

accused is involved. We do not believe that the accused has a right
to have counsel present during purely investigatory activities which
are not designed to elicit information from the accused or otherwise

51. "The denial of the defendant's request for his attorney thus undermined his ability to exercise the privilege [Fifth Amendment]-to remain
silent if he chose or to speak without any intimidation, blatant or subtle.
The presence of counsel

. . .

would be the adequate protective device neces-

sary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of
the privilege. His presence would insure that statements made in the government-established atmosphere are not the product of compulsion." Miranda v. Arizona,
52. 64 Cal. 2d
53. Id. at 211,
54. 62 Cal. 2d

384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966).
208, 411 P.2d 114, 49 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1966).
411 P.2d at 116, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965).
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impinge upon his constitutional rights. [emphasis added] 55
Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution does indeed require counsel in situations where the defendant's rights may be
forever lost. In Dorado counsel was required at a custodial interrogation to insure against the potential loss of the privilege against
self-incrimination. Does not the same reasoning apply with equal
force in a situation where the defendant stands to lose his right to
effectively assert his due process right to a fair lineup?
In challenging a lineup on due process grounds, the defendant
must bear the burden of proof. 6 Cross-examination of witnesses
will afford the defendant his only means of meeting this burden.
The question becomes whether counsel probing in the dark as to
what happened at the lineup is a satisfactory method of preserving
a fundamental right of fairness. In case after case where a lineup
is challenged on due process grounds, the challenge is overruled for
failure to make an adequate record.5 7 It is only in the most
blatant cases of unfairness where the defendant is effectively able
to assert a due process argument.5 8 One can only wonder at the
number of unfair lineups that go undetected under the present
method of assuring due process to a criminal defendant. Surely a
lineup, conducted in the absence of counsel, amounts to an event
that carries a substantial probability of prejudice to the accused.
It is precisely the kind of event that the California Supreme Court
in Dorado held Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution
sought to protect. Article I, section 13 incorporates not only the
due process protection of a right to a fair lineup, but also the
means to insure that a citizen receives due process through presence of counsel at any pretrial lineup. 59
CONCLUSION
A man is placed in a lineup who stands accused of rape. He at55. Id. at 348, 398 P.2d at 368, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
56. See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 5 Cal. App. 3d 889, 86 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1970).
57. See, e.g., People v. Bonville, 268 Cal. App. 2d 107, 73 Cal. Rptr. 741
(1968).
58. In People v. Hogan, 264 Cal. App. 2d 254, 70 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1968)
a witness to a burglary described the thief as a black man to the police.
The defendant, a black, was identified by the witness in a lineup which consisted of the defendant, a Mexican man and two other white men.
59. Supra at note 39.

tempts to look at the men standing next to him, but is told, "Face
the front." He sees figure-like shadows below him with an arm
pointed in his direction. Lights glare in his face. He hears tones of
unintelligible conversation and the sound of movement about the
room. Then, sudden silence and the snap of "number three step
forward" commands his movement. "Keep quiet, honey, or I'll kill
you" is forced from his lips. The staccato of "Yes, yes that's him"
is replaced by the sound of soft sobbing. Our man has been identified, we have the rapist.
"But wait!" he implores...
Too late ...

we have all we need.

At this most critical point of a lifetime, the law today would
have this man stand alone...
But wait you say! The most noble principle of law forbids unfairness. Surely he must be the man; why else would she pick
him?
"Why else would she pick him?" Is not this the precise question
on which the fate of this man depends? The ability to answer this
question is the very heart of the matter. The question may indeed
be metaphysical and beyond the reach of human understanding,
but our man does not ask for tentacles to probe into the mind of
the witness. Rather, in the name of fairness, he asks for a friend, a
counselor, another set of eyes and ears that will deliver him from
his ignorance in the face of the most devastating charge, "That's
the man."
JOHN MORAVEK

